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Abstract
Systematic asymmetries in exchange behavior have been widely interpreted as sup-
port for endowment eect theory, that loss aversion associated with ownership creates an
asymmetry in valuations and exchange behavior. According to this theory, which is an
application of prospect theory, parting with an endowed object produces a loss that is
greater than the gain from acquiring another object of otherwise equal value. The results
also have been cited as general support for prospect theory, of which loss aversion is a fun-
damental component. The experiments reported here suggest that such interpretations
of observed exchange asymmetries are incorrect. While exchange asymmetries are readily
observable, the data reported here support the claim that measurements of preferences
are confounded by experimental procedures. In other words, the data suggest that ex-
perimental procedures lead to observed exchange asymmetries. In treatments for which
endowment eect theory would predict exchange asymmetries, we observe no asymme-
tries when we eliminate alternative explanations related to procedures. Therefore, our
results do not support the use of observed exchange asymmetries as evidence of loss aver-
sion, endowment eect theory or prospect theory and call into question normative legal
analyses grounded in these theories of decision making.
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1 Introduction 
Knetsch (1989) reports an impressive and important discovery. Using a simple 
experiment, he demonstrated the existence of asymmetries in exchange behavior.1 More 
specifically, when he endowed subjects with coffee mugs and provided each subject an 
opportunity to exchange the endowed mug for a candy bar, he found that very few 
subjects wished to give up the endowed mug. By contrast, when a different group of 
subjects was endowed with candy bars, very few wished to give up the candy bar in 
exchange for a mug.  
 Such observed exchange asymmetries have been interpreted in a large and growing 
literature as support for “endowment effect theory”: the notion that loss aversion 
associated with ownership leads to asymmetries in valuations and exchange behavior.2 
The theory posits that individuals perceive parting with an endowed good as a loss that 
is greater than a potential gain from acquiring another good of otherwise equal value 
(Thaler, 1980). In turn, this interpretation generates support for a specific theory of 
choice behavior called prospect theory, of which loss aversion is a major component.3  
                                                 
* Edward S. Harkness Professor of Economics and Political Science, cplott@hss.caltech.edu; Associate 
Professor of Law, zeiler@law.georgetown.edu; www.georgetown.edu/faculty/kmz3/. The financial 
support of the National Science Foundation, and the Laboratory of Experimental Economics and Political 
Science is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Jennifer Arlen, Heidi Li Feldman, Russell Korobkin, 
Richard Lazarus and Rebecca Tushnet for helpful discussions and comments. In addition, we are grateful 
for comments provided during presentations of earlier versions of this paper at the Stanford University 
SITE Conference, the Law and Society Association Annual Meeting, the American Law and Economics 
Association Annual Meeting  and the law schools of Columbia University, Georgetown University, the 
University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill and the University of Texas - Austin. We are grateful to Kevin 
Pooler, JD Ellis, Joseph Shifer and Carl Hinneschiedt for excellent research assistance and to several 
Caltech and Georgetown students who helped us run the experiments. 
1 Knetsch’s study was not the first to report asymmetries of this sort (e.g., see Rowe, d’Arge and 
Brookshire (1980)). It is important to note that the present study’s investigation does not address studies 
that report gaps between willingness to pay and willingness to accept. For a review of these studies see 
Plott and Zeiler (2005), which reports data supporting the conjecture that observed gaps between 
willingness to pay and willingness to accept cannot be used to support endowment theory. 
2 Confusion in the literature has emerged due to the language used to describe exchange asymmetries. 
From the beginning (i.e., Thaler, 1980) the label “endowment effect” commonly has been used to refer to 
observed asymmetries. Using this label to refer to the observed phenomenon is problematic because it 
suggests a particular theory as an explanation for asymmetries we refer to as “endowment effect theory.” 
To say that an observed phenomenon demonstrates an endowment effect does not simply mean that an 
asymmetry was observed, but rather the use of the label directly implies that the observed asymmetry was 
caused by the influence of ownership on preferences. In some cases throughout this paper we use 
“endowment effect theory” to distinguish the theoretical explanation from the observed phenomenon, 
which we refer to as an “exchange asymmetry.” See Section 2 for a summary of how the interpretation of 
observed asymmetries has developed in the literature. 
3 Kahenman and Tversky (1979) developed prospect theory as an alternative to expected utility theory to 
explain how individuals make decisions under uncertainty. According to prospect theory, preferences are 
characterized by two fundamental features: (1) reference-point dependence (i.e., gains and losses are 
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 The existence of exchange asymmetries rests on a good empirical foundation and 
cannot be dismissed. Knetsch’s results have been replicated many times.4 The 
experiment’s simple design, however, creates an impression that only endowment effect 
theory can account for observed asymmetries. Indeed, the design’s simplicity has led 
some to question the results of more sophisticated and carefully constructed 
experiments that do not support endowment effect theory or prospect theory.5 The 
apparent robustness of the results has directed research away from the methods by 
which choices are elicited and toward a particular theory of preferences and conjectures 
about how the nature of different goods influences choices.6 The results from our study 
suggest that such diversions are premature. 
 The experimental results reported here suggest that the interpretation of exchange 
asymmetries as support for endowment effect theory and prospect theory is misguided. 
Our results support the conjecture that experimental procedures account for observed 
asymmetries. We employ several variations of the standard procedures to demonstrate 
that asymmetries depend strongly on procedures, and that previous measures of 
exchange asymmetries are likely confounded by phenomena unrelated to loss aversion. 
Our results demonstrate that, when confounders are eliminated, asymmetries predicted 
by endowment effect theory disappear. 
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a recap of the design of and 
results from exchange experiments and provides evidence of the proliferation of the 
interpretation of exchange asymmetries as support for endowment effect theory in both 
the economics and law literatures. The prevalence of this particular interpretation 
prompted our investigation into whether asymmetries in fact support endowment effect 
theory or whether they result from confounded preference measurements. Section 3 
discusses procedures that might confound preference measurements. If endowment 
effect theory explains observed asymmetries, then the presence of ownership should 
result in a reluctance to exchange. On the other hand, if observed asymmetries are 
influenced by factors such as subject perceptions of the nature of the goods, the method 
by which choices are elicited and the way information is processed then differences in 
experimental procedures will produce divergent results even when ownership is held 
constant across designs. Section 4 discusses the basic features and results of the 
experiments we designed to explore whether procedures confound the measurement of 
preferences. We first report the results from a pair of experiments designed to 
investigate whether asymmetries result from confounded preference measurements. 
                                                                                                                                               
evaluated from some reference point), and (2) loss aversion (i.e., the notion that individuals experience 
more disutility from losses as they do utility from gains of the same size). 
4 See Section 2 for a summary of the experimental literature.  
5 For example, Korobkin (2003) argues that the endowment effect is probably not the result of a “strategic 
heuristic” (i.e., a tendency for subjects to revert to basic instincts as sellers (ask high) and buyers (bid 
low)), a conjecture we investigate in an earlier study (Plott and Zeiler (2005)). To support this claim, 
Korobkin points to the results from simple exchange experiments similar to those Knetsch (1989) 
designed. He argues that, if exchange asymmetries are observed even when subjects have no opportunity 
to ask high as sellers or bid low as buyers, then the “strategic heuristic” probably does not account for the 
results of experiments in which no gap is observed between willingness to pay and willingness to accept 
(e.g., Plott and Zeiler (2005)). The results reported in Section 4 call Korobkin’s argument into question. 
6 [cites to literature on endowment effects related to money, lotteries, induced-value tokens, mugs, pens, 
candy bars, environmental goods, etc. including Loomes, Orr and Sugden (2005 working paper); Camerer 
2005? The meta study?] 
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Next we report the results from two experiments designed to begin investigating the 
effects and interdependencies of individual design features. The main take-away point is 
that exchange asymmetries are not robust to changes in the procedures used to observe 
choices. Ownership is the one feature we hold constant across all experiments; 
therefore, our results do not support the claim that endowment effect theory explains 
observed asymmetries. Finally, Section 5 concludes that our results, in combination 
with results from other studies,7 strongly suggest that exchange asymmetries result from 
confounded preference measurements. As such, our results call into question proposed 
legal policies that rely on the results of standard “endowment effect” experiments and 
are therefore grounded in the assumption that individual preferences depend on 
endowments and that behavior can be explained by prospect theory. 
 
2  Background 
Knetsch (1989) was the first to report results from exchange experiments, cleverly 
designed to directly test the reversibility of indifference curves. The experiments 
involved two groups of subjects. Each subject in the first group was given a coffee mug 
and then asked to complete a questionnaire.8 Following the questionnaire, the subjects 
were shown candy bars and told that they could each have one in exchange for the mug. 
The subjects were instructed to hold up a piece of paper with the word “trade” written 
on it if the candy bar was preferred to the endowed mug. To reduce transaction costs, 
the experimenter immediately executed all desired trades by taking candy bars to the 
subjects wishing to exchange. Using a second group of subjects, the same experiment 
was performed except that each subject in this group was endowed with a candy bar and 
given an option to trade it for a mug. 
 The results were quite striking. Of the 76 subjects endowed with mugs, 89% chose 
to keep the mug. The possibility that subjects simply preferred the mugs to the candy 
bars was ruled out by the fact that, of the 87 subjects endowed with candy bars, 90% 
chose to keep the endowed candy bar rather than exchange it for a mug. From these 
results, Knetsch concluded that subjects’ choices depended on their endowments. He 
suggested that the dramatic asymmetry resulted from subjects “[weighing] the loss of 
giving up their initial reference entitlement far more heavily than the foregone gains of 
not obtaining the alternative entitlement.” In other words, he interpreted the observed 
behavior as resulting from loss aversion.9 
 Other researchers have obtained similar results using Knetsch’s design. Harbaugh 
et al. (2001) used simple exchange experiments to test whether experience affects the 
reluctance to trade and found that subjects of different ages with different levels of 
market experience tend to leave the experiment with the endowed good rather than 
trading for an alternate good. In addition, List (2003) reports results from exchange 
experiments also designed to study whether market experience affects exchange 
                                                 
7 E.g., see Plott and Zeiler (2005). 
8 The questionnaire was devised as an instrument to allow the subjects to a chance to “experience” 
ownership of the endowed goods for a period of time on the theory that such time would allow them to 
realize a sense of ownership. 
9 In similar experiments designed to test the assumption of transitivity of preferences, Knetsch (1992 and 
1995) obtained nearly identical results. Knetsch (1995) interprets these results as support for loss aversion 
and prospect theory as well.  
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asymmetries. He found that subjects with market experience tend not to display 
exchange asymmetries. For those without market experience, however, he observed a 
significant asymmetry in choices.10 Finally, van Dijk and van Knippenberg (1998) 
conducted exchange experiments to test the effects of the comparability of consumer 
goods on the reluctance to trade. Subjects were “rewarded” with a bottle of wine (half 
one kind and half another) in exchange for participating in the study. Subjects were then 
allowed to trade with one another. The results suggest that subjects were reluctant to 
trade in general and were more reluctant to trade when they perceived large differences 
between the endowed good and the alternate good.11 
 The results from these simple exchange experiments have been interpreted by many 
as resulting from an endowment effect and loss aversion. Thaler (1980) interprets 
observed asymmetries from a variety of settings as resulting from loss aversion. Later 
Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1990) summarize the results reported by Knetsch 
(1989) and interpret the data as support for endowment effect theory.12 They then argue 
that the data support prospect theory. Guth et al. (1997),13 Morrison (1998),14 Chapman 
(1998),15 Liberman et al. (1999),16 Van Boven et al. (2000),17 Wu (2001),18 Mandel 
                                                 
10 In List’s experiments, subjects were presented with the endowment first, possessed it while choosing 
and were gifted it in exchange for completing a questionnaire. The subjects made choices independently 
of other subjects’ choices (i.e., they were approached one at a time) and the procedures did not 
necessarily suggest anything about the relative value of the goods. List (2004) reports similar results from 
a study designed to test whether “consumers learn to overcome the endowment effect in situations beyond 
specific problems they have previously encountered.”  
11 Chapman (1998) conducted a similar experiment to test the effects of the likeness of the goods on 
reluctance to trade. Subjects were randomly endowed with one of four goods and completed a 
questionnaire while in possession of the endowed good. Whether they were informed of the randomness 
of the allocation of goods is not clear. They were then asked whether they would be willing to trade it for 
a similar good and for a dissimilar good. Whether value was suggested by the procedures cannot be 
determined from Chapman’s description of the procedures. Subjects made choices privately using forms. 
Chapman posited that, if individual preferences depend on endowments, the percentage of subjects 
willing to trade would be less than 50%. In three of four treatments, the percentage of subjects willing to 
trade was statistically significantly less than 50% (at the 1% level). In a fourth treatment that controlled 
for transaction costs, however, the percentage of subjects willing to trade in each session was not 
statistically significantly different from 50% (at the 5% level; in the treatments involving dissimilar 
alternate goods the percentage of subjects willing to trade was less than 50% at the 10% level). In fact, in 
one treatment, Chapman finds a weak “reverse” endowment effect (i.e., of 76 subjects, 59% traded for a 
similar good; this percentage is larger than 50%, but only at the 10% level (p = 0.06)). 
12 See also Kahneman et al. (1991). 
13 Guth et al. argue that “effects like the…endowment effect (Knetsch, 1989)…are not easily reconciled 
with the assumption of individual rationality.” 
14 Morrison interprets Knetsch’s (1989) observed exchange asymmetries as resulting from an 
“endowment effect.” 
15 Chapman interprets Knetsch’s (1989) results as a demonstration of the endowment effect. She goes on 
argue that “[a] psychological mechanism that can explain reluctance to trade is loss aversion….”  
16 Liberman et al. refer to the results of Knetsch’s (1989) study as a “typical demonstration of the 
endowment effect.” They then argue that the “endowment effect has been explained in terms of the 
general principle of loss aversion,” a main feature of prospect theory. 
17 Van Boven et al. cite Knetsch (1989) as support for the claim that “owners value things more than do 
buyers simply because they own them.” They go on to argue that “[t]his endowment effect stems 
primarily from people’s greater sensitivity to losses than to gains: A loss of a given magnitude is more 
painful than a gain of an equal magnitude is pleasant.” In other words, exchange experiment results 
support the theory of loss aversion. 
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(2002),19 Van Boven et al. (2003),20 Tom (2004),21 and Huck et al. (2005)22 also invoke 
Knetsch’s results as evidence of  endowment effect theory, loss aversion and/or 
prospect theory. 
 This interpretation of exchange experiment results has bled into legal scholarship as 
well. In separate experimental literature reviews, Korobkin (2003)23 and Rachlinski and 
Jourden (1998)24 refer to Knetsch’s (1989) results as evidence of the existence of an 
endowment effect. Ayres and Vars,25 Smith (2000),26 Stake (2001),27 and Bloche 
(2003)28 also use Knetsch’s results as evidence of the existence of an endowment effect 
(i.e., evidence for endowment effect theory) and/or support for loss aversion and 
prospect theory.29 More importantly, a number of legal commentators advance policy 
prescriptions that are, in part, responses to the existence of an endowment effect.30  
 Given the prevalence of this particular interpretation of Knetsch’s exchange 
experiment results and its application in normative analyses it is important to determine 
whether, in fact, it is a correct interpretation. Does endowment effect theory explain 
exchange asymmetries? Should we attribute this phenomenon to loss aversion and 
prospect theory? Or, are observed asymmetries unrelated to properties of underlying 
preferences and simply the result of particular procedures of the experimental design 
that confound preference measurements? These are the questions we set out to explore 
here. The next section discusses the procedural issues relevant to our investigation.   
                                                                                                                                               
18 Wu cites to Kahnemen et al. (1991) and Knetsch (1989) as support for the claim that “[the] notion of 
‘reference-dependent preferences’ has important implications to the study of externalities and the Coase 
Theorem.” 
19 Mendel refers to Knetsch (1989) as support for the claim that “people tend to demand a higher selling 
price for commodity x that they own than they would be willing to pay in order to acquire x as a buyer.” 
He goes on to explain that this phenomenon, known as the endowment effect, “may be viewed as an 
exemplar of the mere ownership effect in which a target object is rated more favorably by an owner than a 
non-owner.” He then asserts that “[e]xplanations of the endowment effect have tended to rely on 
psychophysicial notions of reference dependence and loss aversion as postulated in prospect theory….” 
20 Van Boven et al. refer to Knetsch (1989) to support their claim that “[t]he endowment effect…is among 
the most robust phenomena in the emerging field of behavioral economics.”   
21  Tom refers to Knetsch (1989) to support the claim that “the endowment effect is a fundamental 
characteristic of consumer preference that is…applicable to a variety of consumption goods….” 
22 Huck et al. point to the results reported by Knetsch (1989) to illustrate the claim that “countless 
experiments” have confirmed early studies providing evidence for the existence of an endowment effect. 
They go on to argue that the endowment effect “must by now be accepted as a stylized fact.” 
23 Korobkin not only analyzes the empirical literature on the endowment effect, but also (rightly) warns 
about the dangers of formulating normative prescriptions given that the endowment effect seems to be 
context dependent and economists have not made much headway in determining the causes of exchange 
asymmetries and gaps between willingness to pay and willingness to accept. 
24 Rachlinski and Jourden refer to Knetsch’s (1989) experimental design as one of “several different 
procedures [used] to demonstrate the endowment effect.” 
25 Aryes and Vars cite to Knetsch (1989) as evidence of the formalization of the theory of loss aversion. 
26 Smith interprets the exchange asymmetries reported by Knetsch (1989) as resulting from an 
endowment effect.   
27 Stake interprets Knetsch’s (1989) results as evidence of loss aversion. 
28 Bloche refers to Knetsch (1989) as evidence of the existence of an endowment effect.  
29 Other legal scholars have challenged the existence and stability of the endowment effect. See Curran 
and Rubin (1995); [Arlen (Vanderbilt paper)?; Arlen, Spitzer and Talley (JLS experimental piece)?]. 
30 [add examples here from cites above] 
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3 Experimental Procedures under Investigation 
This study focuses on subtle features of experimental procedures used in exchange 
experiments. In this section we list the experimental procedures we believe are relevant 
to our investigation and specify our conjectures about why these particular features, as 
opposed to endowment effect theory, might be responsible for observed asymmetries. 
 
3.1 Method used to endow subjects 
The specific method used to determine which good to endow to subjects and the 
language used to convey to subjects the method of determination might influence 
subject behavior. Specifically, whether subjects acquire the endowed good through 
some random process or whether they perceive it as being chosen by the experimenter 
might influence subject choices over goods. According to endowment effect theory, 
however, the method used to endow subjects is a variable that should have no influence 
on choices. 
 While the method used to determine and explain the endowment might influence 
subject choices in myriad ways unrelated to loss aversion, we offer two specific 
possibilities. First, the language typically used to convey the nature of the endowment 
might cause subjects to perceive the endowed good as a gift from the experimenter. For 
example, imagine that the experimenter, after distributing the endowed good, “X,” 
announces, “X is yours. You own X.  I am giving X to you.”31 Subjects might perceive 
this language as indicating that X is a gift from the experimenter, even though the 
experimenter might simply intend to convey that subjects now own X. Given this 
perception, subjects might hesitate to trade the “gift” for the alternate good in deference 
to the experimenter.32 In other words, rather than choosing between a simple mug and a 
simple pen, each subject is choosing between a mug, which was a gift from the 
experimenter, and a pen. 
 Second, subjects might perceive the method used to determine and explain the 
endowment as a signal about the relative value of the goods.33 By engaging in particular 
actions the experimenter might unintentionally reveal what subjects perceive as 
information about the relative value of the endowment. A subject that is indifferent 
between the endowed and alternate goods or has not thought much about the relative 
value of the goods could interpret particular actions as indicating that the experimenter 
possesses information about the relative value of the goods. A subject who perceives the 
experimenter as exercising some judgment in determining which good to endow 
                                                 
31 While the exact language used by experimenters in previous experiments is often not reported, the 
description of the experiments leads one to believe that subjects might have perceived the endowed good 
as a gift. For example, Knetsch (1989) indicates that “76 were given a coffee mug,” and that “87 
participants in the second group were offered an opportunity to make the opposite trade of giving up a 
candy bar, which had been given to them initially…” (emphasis added). 
32 We thank Richard Lazarus for pointing this out as a potentially important variable related to observed 
asymmetries.  
33 That subjects gather information by observing the actions of others is well established (e.g., see Plott 
(2000). Harrison, Harstad and Rutstrom (2004), pp. 128-9, argue that a rational subject who is uncertain 
about relative value must attempt to infer what he can about it from such cues.  Also see Sections 3.2 and 
3.3 for additional conjectures about how procedures might signal value to subjects.  
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reasonably might view the experimenter as having special information about the relative 
value of the goods. 
 To eliminate these alternative explanations of observed asymmetries, we employed 
two different techniques for determining which good to endow. The first technique uses 
language we suspect encourages the subjects to perceive the endowment as a gift. When 
the endowed goods were distributed, the experimenter announced, “I’m giving you X. It 
is a gift. You own it. It is yours.” The second technique was designed to convey that the 
determination of the endowment resulted from a random process—a process through 
which the experimenter exercised no judgment. Subjects were told that the endowed 
good was determined by a coin flip before the start of the experiment.34 If exchange 
asymmetries result from the involvement of the experimenter in determining the 
endowment we should observe an asymmetry when employing the first technique but 
not the second. If, instead, loss aversion explains observed asymmetries we should 
observe an asymmetry regardless of the technique employed. 
 
3.2 Suggestions of Relative Value 
While conducting exchange experiments, experimenters tend to incorporate procedures 
that allow subjects to realize a sense of ownership vis-a-vis the endowed good prior to 
asking them to choose one of the goods. For example, subjects often are asked to fill out 
questionnaires while the endowed good is in front of them. This is thought to provide 
subjects enough time to develop a sense of ownership (Knetsch, 1989). 
 A close examination of the procedures, however, reveals that experimenters, intent 
on emphasizing ownership, might inadvertently signal to the subjects that the endowed 
good is more valuable than the alternate good.35 For example, emphasizing ownership 
(e.g., “This good is yours. You own it. It belongs to you.”), in an attempt to establish a 
sense of ownership, might signal to the subjects that the endowed good is more valuable 
than the alternate good. Alternatively, this sort of language might be interpreted as a 
signal from the experimenter that the “correct” choice is to maintain ownership of the 
endowed good.   
 To test whether this feature of the procedures might lead to exchange asymmetries, 
we altered the standard procedures in two ways. First, when we distributed the 
endowments, we simply said, “These X’s are yours.” This is in contrast to emphasizing 
ownership by saying, “I’m giving you X. It is a gift. You own it. It is yours.” Second, 
the forms subjects used to communicate their choices simply instructed, “Please circle 
the item you wish to take home with you.” The form included three choices: “X,” “Y,” 
and “I DON’T CARE.” This is in contrast to stating the choices as “I want to keep my 
X,” and “I want to trade my X for a Y.” If exchange asymmetries are caused by 
experimental procedures that suggest relative value, then modifying such procedures 
potentially will impact choices. On the other hand, if endowment effect theory explains 
                                                 
34 Specifically subjects were told, “Before the start of the experiment, a coin was flipped to determine 
which good, the mug or the pen, to distribute. It came up heads, which means that we start with the coffee 
mugs (or pens). The subjects in the other room will start with the pens (or coffee mugs).” 
 
35 This conjecture is closely related to the conjecture discussed in the immediately preceding section 
related to possible signals from the experimenter. 
 7
exchange asymmetries, then these subtle changes in language should not affect choices, 
and asymmetries will persist. 
 
3.3 Location of endowed good at time of choice 
Where the endowed good is located at the time subjects make their choices might 
influence their decisions. It is important to note that in standard exchange experiments, 
the experimenter places the endowed good immediately in front of the subjects. As with 
other procedures analyzed previously, it could be that subjects perceive the position of 
the endowed good relative to the alternate good as a signal of relative value. 
 To test whether this feature of the procedures might lead to exchange asymmetries, 
we altered the standard procedures in a simple way. After presenting subjects with the 
endowed good and allowing them to inspect it while completing the questionnaires, we 
replaced the endowed good with the alternate good (reminding subjects that they still 
owned the endowed good even though it was not sitting in front of them). If exchange 
asymmetries are caused by signals of relative value produced by the location of the 
goods, then removing this sort of signal will influence exchange asymmetries (or result 
in reverse asymmetries). On the other hand, if endowment effect theory explains 
exchange asymmetries, then this change in procedures should not affect choices, and 
asymmetries will remain.  
 We constructed an additional treatment (referred to as the “transaction costs test”) 
to investigate a second conjecture about how the location of the endowed good might 
influence choices. Specifically, if a subject is indifferent between the endowed good and 
the alternate good, even a very slight transaction cost (e.g., requiring a subject to raise 
his hand if he wishes to trade or to take any sort of action to initiate a trade such as the 
physical exchange of the endowment for the alternate good) might encourage him to 
keep the good within reach. Indeed, Chapman (1998) speculated that some of her results 
were due to reluctance to trade because subjects were “truly indifferent between the two 
items and trading involved transaction costs.” Many experimenters (e.g., Knetsch 
(1989)) design procedures to eliminate (or at least reduce) transaction costs in an 
attempt to rule them out as a direct cause of observed asymmetries (e.g., hand 
delivering the alternate good to subjects). The complete removal of transaction costs has 
proved difficult, however. Few, if any, have been able to conclude definitively that they 
are not an important driver of observed asymmetries. 
 We took a different approach to investigate whether transaction costs explain 
observe asymmetries. We used an approximation of the standard procedures to elicit 
choices except that we asked subjects to make choices while the alternate good was 
within their reach.36 If subjects are indifferent between the goods and transaction costs 
make subjects reluctant to trade, then we should observe a “reverse” asymmetry when 
subjects make choices while the alternate good is in front of them and the endowed 
good is not. Put simply, transaction costs will result in subjects keeping the alternate 
good rather than trading back for the endowed good. On the other hand, if endowment 
                                                 
36 See Section 4.2.1 for specific procedures employed in the transaction cost treatment. 
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effect theory accounts for observed asymmetries, then we should observe subjects 
trading to retrieve their endowed goods.37 
 
3.4 Public revelation of choices 
Signals as a source of information about value can enter through yet another aspect of 
the procedures typically employed in studies that report exchange asymmetries. In most 
reported exchange experiments, including Knetsch’s (1989) experiment, subjects are 
asked to raise their hands if they wish to trade the endowed good for the alternate good. 
The resulting public revelation of choices might cause a “cascade” of sorts, as those 
who are contemplating choosing one good might observe, as hands begin to go up or 
stay down, that most others seem to prefer the other good.38 Public revelation of choices 
might trigger cascades if subjects view other subjects’ decisions as signals that provide 
information about the relative value of the goods. That subjects interpret the choices of 
others as signals of value is well established.39 
 To control the influence of public revelation of choices on behavior, we used forms 
to allow subjects to indicate their choices privately. This ensures that subjects’ choices 
                                                 
37 Of course it could be that transaction costs and endowment effect theory, in combination with one 
another, make subjects reluctant to trade. If this is the case, then our results might only provide evidence 
about which effect overpowers the other in particular contexts.  
 In a separate test, we investigated whether the order in which the experimenter presents the goods to 
the subjects matters (see Harrison et al. (2003) for a general discussion of how order effects tend to 
confound results). We made a simple change to the standard procedures: We presented subjects with the 
alternate good before presenting them with the endowed good. During these sessions, we distributed 
mugs to the subjects and informed them that the mugs did not belong to them but that they should inspect 
them because they would be given an opportunity to obtain one later in the session. We then asked the 
subjects to complete the questionnaires. After the questionnaires were completed, we removed the mugs 
and placed them at the front of the room and distributed pens to the subjects. Once each subject possessed 
a pen the experimenter announced, “These pens are yours.” Each student then filled out a form to indicate 
whether he wanted to keep his pen or trade his pen for a mug. Once the subjects completed the forms by 
choosing one of the options, the experimenter walked around the room to collect the forms and make any 
necessary exchanges. We conducted additional sessions using an identical design except that the sessions 
started with pens rather than mugs. 
 We collected data from 50 Georgetown University law students. We endowed 17 subjects with 
mugs and 33 with pens. Seventy-one percent of the mug owners left with mugs and 64% of the pen 
owners left with mugs. The proportions are not statistically significantly different (p = 0.31; power = 
0.0675). This result differs from those obtained using the standard procedures; therefore, it supports the 
conjecture that order effects might confound preference measurements. 
 Further investigation is required, however, to better understand this result. In this experiment forms 
were used to collect choices rather than raised hands. Therefore, we cannot infer that order alone caused 
the disparate results. As a general matter, we have only limited notions about the independent 
contribution of various aspects of procedures. Thus, we chose to conserve our research budget and 
subject pool and not attempt to isolate all the possible effects of individual procedures and how they 
might interaction with one another. While these preliminary results suggest that it is reasonable to infer 
that the order of presentation at least contributes to the disappearance of asymmetries, further study of 
these feature and additional data are necessary to better understand the nature of this phenomenon. 
38 In an early pilot we encountered just this sort of behavior. Subjects reported to us after the experiment 
that they were using raised hands as an indication of the relative value of the goods and that this 
influenced their decisions. We also noticed this phenomenon time and time again in later experiments in 
which we collected choices using raised hands and directly observed the sequences in which the hands 
were raised.  See Table 2 for a breakdown of the data by session. 
39 See Anderson and Holt (1977); Hung and Plott (2001). 
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are independent of other subjects’ choices. If exchange asymmetries are due to the 
public nature of choice elicitation, then allowing subjects to communicate their 
decisions privately should eliminate them. On the other hand, if endowment effect 
theory explains asymmetries, then the elicitation mechanism should not significantly 
influence the results. 
 The following section provides details on the exact procedures we used to elicit 
choices in four exchange experiments that implement various sets of the procedures 
discussed in this section. In addition, we provide results from each treatment. 
 
4 Experiment Designs and Results 
To explore the influences of different sets of procedures we employed various designs 
that incorporate different combinations of the procedures. Clearly we have not offered a 
formal theory of exactly how all aspects of individual procedures might influence 
choices. Indeed, different procedures might interact through the same vehicle, such as 
signaling, or procedures might confound an effect by reinforcing the influences of a 
particular signal. Given this possibility our research strategy is not to identify the 
influence of each procedure that we might imagine but instead operate through 
collections of procedures. In this manner we can explore the impact of procedures 
generally without analyzing their particular aspects in great detail. Of course we have an 
interest in the contribution of individual procedures or particular aspects of individual 
procedures, and the design does provide some such focus, but understanding the micro-
structure of each procedure’s contribution is not required to conclude that procedures as 
a whole (as opposed to an endowment effect) are responsible for exchange 
asymmetries. 
 The first pair of results demonstrates that procedures dramatically affect choices. 
From this we conclude that the procedures, and not endowment effect theory, account 
for observed exchange asymmetries. The second set of results, which represents the first 
step of an investigation of individual procedures and possible interactions between 
them, provides insights into which procedures (or combinations of procedures) seem to 
be driving differences in elicited choices. The features of each design are summarized in 
Table 1.40 We drew our subjects from pools of Caltech students and Georgetown Law 
students (see Table 2 for details). 
 
4.1 Asymmetries Depend Strongly on Procedures 
To test for whether elicitation procedures affect subject choices, we conducted two 
treatments. The first treatment, which we use as a baseline, contains none of the 
controls we identified as important for proper preference measurements. The second 
incorporates controls meant to eliminate possible confounders of preference 
measurement. The data support the conjecture that observed exchange asymmetries 
result from confounded preference measurements. Specifically, we observed a 
significant exchange asymmetry when no controls are employed. When we control for 
confounders, however, the asymmetry disappears. 
 4.1.1 A Baseline  
                                                 
40 Table 2 provides details regarding each session conducted including the date, person(s) who ran the 
experiment, the subject pool and the goods used. We also summarize the results for each session 
individually in Table 2. 
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 We first elicited choices using a set of baseline procedures that have many 
similarities with procedures used in the literature. We call this the “baseline” rather than 
a “replication” because the exact procedures used in earlier studies are not always 
clearly specified in the literature. This baseline allows us to identify controls that 
eliminate confounders of preference measurements.  
 We distributed coffee mugs branded with university insignia to the subjects 
(Caltech mugs to Caltech students and Georgetown mugs to Georgetown students) and 
informed the subjects that they owned the mugs by announcing, “I’m giving you the 
mug. It is a gift. You own it. It is yours.”41 While the endowed goods were located in 
front of the subjects, we allowed them approximately three minutes to fill out 
questionnaires.42 After they completed the questionnaires, we allowed them to pass a 
few pens around the room so they could inspect them.43 Once each subject had an 
opportunity to inspect a pen the experimenter instructed, “Please raise your hand if you 
want to keep the mug, the thing you own, rather than trading it for a pen.”44 The 
experimenter then walked around the room to make any necessary exchanges. We 
conducted additional sessions using an identical design except that subjects were 
endowed with pens instead of mugs. 
 We collected data from 129 Georgetown University law students and Caltech 
students. We endowed 64 subjects with mugs and 65 with pens. Eighty-four percent of 
the mug owners left with mugs and 28% of the pen owners left with mugs. A two-
sample, one-tailed test of equality of proportions supports a rejection of the null 
hypothesis that the percentages are identical in favor of the alternative hypothesis that 
the percentage of mug owners that left with mugs is greater than the percentage of pen 
owners that left with mugs (p = 0.00). In other words, these data reveal a statistically 
significant exchange asymmetry.  
 4.1.2 Full Set of Controls 
 Next we modified the procedures to test for whether particular procedures lead to 
exchange asymmetries. We began these sessions by informing the subjects that mugs 
and pens would be used during the experiment. Subjects were then told that a coin was 
flipped before the start of the experiment to determine which good, the mug or the pen, 
would be distributed first. We then distributed mugs to the subjects and announced, 
“These coffee mugs are yours.” Next, we asked the subjects to complete the 
                                                 
41 We obtained the coffee mugs from campus bookstores for roughly $5 apiece. We removed the price 
tags from all goods prior to conducting the sessions. 
42 Appendix A contains a typical questionnaire. Subjects’ answers to the questions were irrelevant to our 
study. We employed the questionnaires so that our results would be comparable to previously reported 
results. Each session lasted for less than ten minutes and subjects possessed the endowed good for 
roughly three to five minutes before making their choices. This is roughly the same amount of time 
provided in other experiments of this kind. 
43 The pens, which were labeled with the name of the subjects’ university, were also obtained from 
campus bookstores for approximately $5 apiece. In one session we used candy bars that were not labeled 
with the name of the university but cost roughly the same as the other goods. 
44 The standard procedures ask subjects to raise their hands if they want to trade the endowed good for 
the alternate good.  We altered this feature of the standard procedures to test our conjecture that public 
choices lead to cascades. If the lack of controls in this design encourages subjects to keep the endowed 
good, the subjects will tend to raise their hands. If our cascades conjecture is correct (see Section 3.4 
supra), subjects will tend to go along with the perceived majority. It seems reasonable to assume that a 
majority with raised hands is easier to detect than a majority that remains with hands down.  
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questionnaires. After the questionnaires were completed, we took the mugs from the 
subjects, placed them at the front of the room and distributed pens to the subjects. After 
providing time to inspect the pens, we asked each subject to decide which good to keep 
and to indicate the decision on a form.45 The forms simply indicated the options and did 
not re-emphasize the fact that subjects owned one of the goods. Once each subject 
completed a form, the experimenter walked around the room to collect them and make 
any necessary exchanges. We conducted additional sessions using an identical design 
except that subjects owned pens rather than mugs.  
 In Table 1 we report the features of and results from this treatment. We collected 
data from 139 Georgetown University law students (see Table 2 for session details); 69 
were endowed with mugs and 70 were endowed with pens. Fifty-four percent of the 
mug owners left with mugs and 67% of the pen owners left with mugs. A two-sample, 
one-tailed test of equality of proportions supports the hypothesis that the percentages 
are identical (p = 0.95).46 In other words, we observed no exchange asymmetry of the 
expected sort under this set of procedures. Indeed, we observe a (somewhat weak) 
reverse asymmetry.47 
 These results, taken together, support the conjecture that exchange asymmetries 
result from experimental procedures and cannot be explained by endowment effect 
theory or prospect theory. The next section reports results of the beginnings of an 
exploration of the effects of specific procedures and how procedures interact with one 
another. 
 
4.2 Initial Tests of Specific Procedures and Their Interactions  
Without a clear theory of the mechanisms through which procedures influence choice it 
is almost futile to study the effects of individual procedures on choices. Despite this, 
using key procedures as cornerstones we begin an investigation into the effects of 
specific procedures and how procedures interact with one another. This section reports 
the design features of these treatments and their results.48 
 4.2.1 Transaction Cost Test 
 The transaction cost test was designed to explore whether transaction costs might 
explain observed asymmetries. We distributed coffee mugs to the subjects and informed 
them that they owned the mugs. While the endowed good was located in front of them, 
subjects spent approximately three minutes filling out questionnaires. After they 
completed the questionnaires, we removed the endowed mugs and placed the mugs at 
                                                 
45 See Appendix C for a sample of the forms used during these sessions. Subjects were given an 
opportunity to indicate indifference between the goods by circling the option “DON’T CARE.” None of 
the subjects asked which good would be received upon choosing this option. Each subject who chose 
“DON’T CARE” received the good in her possession at the time she completed the form. Only 17 of the 
139 subjects reported indifference; therefore, the results from statistical tests of differences of proportions 
are virtually identical when we include and exclude these data.  
46 We tested the null hypothesis of equality against an alternative hypothesis that the percentage of mug 
owners that left with mugs was greater than the percentage of pen owners that left with mugs. 
47 When the alternative hypothesis is framed as “the percentage of pen owners that left with mugs is 
greater than the percentage of mug owners that left with mugs,” a two-sample test of equality of 
proportions results in a p-value of 0.06. 
48 To be clear, this set of experiments represents only the beginnings of the construction of a more 
complete set of experiments that one might use to explore more thoroughly the design issues we identify. 
The complete set, however, is outside the scope of this study. 
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the front of the room (reminding them that they still owned them) and passed around 
pens for their inspection. Each student then filled out a form to indicate whether he 
wanted to keep his mug or trade his mug for a pen.49 Once the subjects completed the 
forms by choosing one of the options, the experimenter walked around the room to 
collect the forms and make any necessary exchanges. We conducted additional sessions 
using an identical design except that subjects were endowed with pens instead of mugs.  
 We collected data from 101 Georgetown University law students and Caltech 
students (see Table 2 for session details). We endowed 53 subjects with mugs and 48 
with pens. Seventy-two percent of the mug owners left with mugs and 50% of the pen 
owners left with mugs. A two-sample, one-tailed test of equality of proportions supports 
a rejection of the null hypothesis that the percentages are identical in favor of the 
alternative hypothesis that the percentage of mug owners that left with mugs is greater 
than the percentage of pen owners that left with mugs (p = 0.01). In other words, these 
data reveal a statistically significant exchange asymmetry. 
 This result suggests that transaction costs do not drive observed exchange 
asymmetries. In addition, when combined with the results from the treatment employing 
a full set of controls (see Section 4.1.2), this result suggests that other modifications of 
the standard procedures (e.g., removing the experimenter from the determination of the 
endowment, etc.) possibly account for the elimination of exchange asymmetries in that 
particular treatment.50 Further study is required to better understand these results. 
 4.2.2 Standard Procedures 
This design tests for possible effects of changing the meaning of raised hands during the 
choice phase of the experiment. This design is identical to the baseline design except 
that a raised hand indicates that the subject desires to trade the endowed good for the 
alternate good rather than keeping it.51 By altering the design in this way, we attempt to 
gain insight into what sorts of signals subjects send to one another when they make 
public choices and how these signals interact with other procedures. 
 In Table 1 we report the features of and results from this treatment. We collected 
data from 96 Georgetown University law students (see Table 2 for session details). We 
endowed 44 subjects with mugs and 52 with pens. Seventy-seven percent of the mug 
owners left with mugs and 62% of the pen owners left with mugs. A two-sample, one-
tailed test of equality of proportions (somewhat weakly) supports a rejection of the null 
hypothesis that the percentages are identical in favor of the alternative hypothesis that 
the percentage of mug owners that left with mugs is greater than the percentage of pen 
owners that left with mugs (p = 0.06). In other words, we observed an exchange 
                                                 
49 Appendix B contains the form the subjects used to communicate their decisions. 
50 It also suggests that the results obtained when implementing the full set of controls are not driven by 
the fact that the endowed good is not in front of the subjects when they are choosing between the two 
goods. 
51 Of all the designs we study, the “standard procedures” design seems most similar to Knetsch’s (1989) 
procedures (hence the label). Note one important possible exception, however. Knetsch (1989) does not 
make clear the exact language used to convey ownership to the subjects. Therefore, our language (i.e., 
“I’m giving you the mug. It is a gift. You own it. It is yours.”) might not mirror the language Knetsch 
used. 
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asymmetry.52 That the result from this treatment differs from the result of the baseline 
design indicates that choices are sensitive to subtle changes in the experiment design. 
 In sum, it is important to stress that any inferences about how particular features of 
the procedures affect choices are mere conjectures at this stage. Given our results, we 
suspect that interaction effects exist between various procedures and the information 
contained in Table 1 is insufficient to understand them. Understanding the interaction 
effects between procedures, however, could be useful in constructing a theory that 
explains and predicts behavior in exchange experiments (and more broadly).53 This 
study represents the first attempt to understand how procedures influence whether 
exchange asymmetries are observed. Further research is necessary to understand more 
fully the interaction effects between the procedures. 
 
6 Discussion and Conclusions 
Observed exchange asymmetries have been advanced as support for special theories 
about the basic principles underlying preferences and valuation (e.g., valuations depend 
on ownership status); therefore, Knetsch’s (1989) discovery should not be dismissed. 
The experiments we report, along with those reported by others, however, suggest that 
the procedures used in the experiments have a systematic influence on the patterns of 
observed choices. Such data stimulate questions about the precise connections between 
procedures and choices. Our thesis is that the nature of the connection goes beyond the 
basic elements of endowment effect theory and prospect theory and to the procedures 
themselves.  
 Our empirical results suggest that either no “endowment effect” of the sort 
predicted by prospect theory exists or the effect is sufficiently weak that other 
phenomena easily swamp it. If asymmetries of observed choices are to be interpreted as 
strong evidence about the principles that operate when individuals make choices, then 
such asymmetries should be robust against subtle features of procedures and variations 
in the set of procedures used to conduct experiments. While we suspect that a general 
theory about perception and related features of decision processes might explain 
observed asymmetries we hasten to note that this sort of explanation is unrelated to any 
theory about the particular shapes of preferences. The asymmetries exhibited in 
exchange experiments do not seem to be sufficiently robust to support loss aversion and 
prospect theory as a foundation for normative claims regarding policy and law. More 
research, however, is needed to determine the precise connections between procedures 
and choices.  
                                                 
52 This result is not as strong as Knetsch’s original result (see Section 2, supra). Our study does not 
provide enough information, however, to speculate about which features of the design might be driving 
the disparity in results. 
53 Harrison, Harstad and Rutstrom (2004) begin some steps in this direction. 
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Table 1: Design Features and Continuum of Results 
(from no asymmetry to significant asymmetry) 
 
The bolded entries indicate the particular controls in place for each treatment. 
 
Overall, we observed a general preference for the mug. Of the 531 subjects that participated (including pilots), 330 (or 
62%) left with mugs. This is statistically significantly greater than 50% (p = 0.00). This general mug preference, 
however, does not affect our results as we measured asymmetries by comparing the percentage of mug owners that left 
with mugs and the percentage of alternate good owners that left with mugs. This measurement controls for the overall 
mug preference. 
 
† Results are from two-sample tests of equality of proportions (null hypothesis: proportions are equal; alternative 
hypothesis: % mug owners that left with mugs > % of pen owners that left with mugs). 
 
‡ If we use an alternative hypothesis of Ha: % of mugs owners that left with mugs < % of pen owners that left with mugs, 
the p value is equal to 0.06. This (weakly) supports a hypothesis that a “reverse” asymmetry exists. 
 
Full Set of 
Procedural 
Controls 
Standard 
Procedures 
Transaction 
Costs Test 
Baseline 
Procedures 
Endowed good 
immediately in 
front of subject at 
time of choice 
NO YES NO YES 
Experimenter 
chose and gave 
OR randomly 
assigned which 
good to endow 
RANDOMLY 
ASSIGNED 
EXPERIMENTER 
CHOSE AND GAVE 
EXPERIMENTER 
CHOSE AND GAVE 
EXPERIMENTER 
CHOSE AND GAVE 
Experimenter 
purposefully and 
repeatedly 
emphasized 
ownership 
NO YES YES YES 
Choices made by 
public show of 
hands OR use of 
private forms 
FORMS 
HANDS 
(TRADE 
ENDOWED GOOD) 
FORMS 
 
HANDS 
(KEEP ENDOWED 
GOOD) 
 
(# mug owners, # 
pen owners) (69,70) (44,52) (53,48) (64,65) 
(% mug owners 
that left with 
mugs, % pen 
owners that left 
with mugs) 
(54% , 67%) 
diff = −13% 
(77% , 62%) 
diff = 15% 
(72% , 50%) 
Diff = 22% 
(84% , 28%) 
diff = 56% 
Result † p = 0.94 ‡ P = 0.06 p = 0.01 p = 0.00 
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Table 2: Summary of Sessions 
 
 Date Experimenter Subject Pool 
# mug owners /  
# left with mug 
# alt. good* owners / # left 
with mug 
      
Jun 4 03 Zeiler Caltech UG 28 / 19  (68%) 
28 / 14 
(50%) 
Jun 8 and 10 03 Zeiler Gtown JD 13 / 10 (77%) 
10 / 5 
(50%) 
Transaction 
Costs Test 
Jun 25 04 Zeiler Gtown JD 12 / 9 (75%) 
10 / 5 
(50%) 
      
Jul 14 04 Zeiler Gtown JD 8 / 5 [1]** (63%) 
9 / 5 [1] 
(56%) 
Jul 15 04 Zeiler Gtown JD 6 / 4 [1] (67%) 
7 / 4 [1] 
(57%) 
Jul 26 04 RAs Gtown JD 10 / 6 [1] (60%) 
5 / 2 [1] 
(40%) 
Jul 27 04 RAs Gtown JD 5 / 4 [1] (80%) 
5 / 4 [0] 
(80%) 
Aug 03 04 RAs Gtown JD 9 / 1 [1] (11%) 
18 / 12 [1] 
(67%) 
Sept 20 04 Zeiler Gtown JD 17 / 8 [3] (47%) 
14 / 11 [1] 
(79%) 
June 21 05 Zeiler and RA Gtown JD 4  / 2 [1] (50%) N/A 
June 23 05 Zeiler and RA Gtown JD 5 / 2 [0] (40%) 
8 / 6 [2] 
(75%) 
Full Set of 
Procedural 
Controls 
June 27 05 Zeiler and RA Gtown JD 5 / 5 [0] (100%) 
4 / 3 [1] 
(75%) 
      
Aug 2004 Plott and RA Caltech 9 / 7 (78%) 
8 / 2 
(25%) 
Aug 18 04 Plott Caltech 7 / 5 (71%) N/A 
Sept 9 04 Zeiler and faculty assistant Gtown JD 
17 / 14 
(82%) 
17 / 3 
(18%) 
April 26 05 Zeiler and RA Gtown JD 8 / 7 (88%) 
15 / 6 
(40%) 
June 17 05 Zeiler and RAs Gtown JD 8 / 8 (100%) 
7 / 2 
(29%) 
June 29 05 Zeiler and RA Gtown JD 8 / 7 (88%) 
8 / 2 
(25%) 
July 10 05 Zeiler and RA Gtown JD N/A 10 / 3 (30%) 
Baseline 
Procedures 
July 11 05 Zeiler and RA Gtown JD 7 / 6 (86%) N/A 
      
Sept 01 04 Zeiler and RA Gtown JD 15 / 12 (80%) 
30 / 18 
(60%) 
April 14 05 Zeiler and faculty assistant Gtown JD 
9 / 6 
(67%) 
11 / 9 
(82%) 
Standard 
Procedures 
June 30 05 Zeiler and RAs Gtown JD 20 / 16 (80%) 
11 / 5 
(45%) 
 
* In each session except for the first session conducted on June 4, 2004, we used pens as the alternate good. During the first session 
we used candy bars. 
 
** The numbers enclosed in square brackets indicate the number of subjects who reported being indifferent between the two goods 
by circling “DON’T CARE” on the decision record. See Appendix C for form used during sessions. 
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Appendix A: A Sample Questionnaire 
 
 
1.  The current U.S. Secretary of State is 
 
 ____________________________. 
 
How likely is it that your answer is correct? ___________ % 
  (enter a likelihood between 0% and 100%)  
 
 
2.  Bucharest is the capital city of   
 
  ____________________________. 
 
How likely is it that your answer is correct? ___________ % 
  (enter a likelihood between 0% and 100%)  
 
 
3.  The author of the novel The Phantom of the Opera is     
  
 ____________________________. 
 
How likely is it that your answer is correct? ___________ %  
  (enter a likelihood between 0% and 100%) 
 
 
4. The actor __________________ plays the U.S. President on the TV series The 
West Wing. 
 
How likely is it that your answer is correct? ___________ %  
  (enter a likelihood between 0% and 100%) 
 
 
5.  What does the acronym NASA stand for? 
 
 ___________________________________ 
 
How likely is it that your answer is correct? ___________ %   
 (enter a likelihood between 0% and 100%) 
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Appendix B: Sample Transaction Records for Transaction Cost Test 
 
 
 
Transaction Record 
 
 □    I want to keep my mug. 
 
 □    I want to trade my mug for a pen. 
 
 
This form was used in sessions in which we endowed subjects 
with mugs. Subjects were asked to check one box. 
 
 
 
Transaction Record 
 
 □    I want to keep my pen. 
 
 □    I want to trade my pen for a mug. 
 
This form was used in sessions in which we endowed subjects 
with pens. 
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Appendix C: Sample Decision Record for Sessions Using Full Set of 
Procedural Controls 
 
 
DECISION RECORD 
 
 
 
Please circle the item you wish to take home with you. 
 
 
MUG                     PEN 
 
 
DON’T CARE 
 
 
 
 
